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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Should the decision of the Court of Appeals be 
reversed because it is erroneously based on the premise that 
Petitioner's counsel stipulated that his client consented to 
the search of his truck when there was no such stipulation? 
2. Is the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding 
the voluntariness of Mr. Arroyo's consent supported by the 
record? 
3. Is the decision of the Court of Appeals that volun-
tary consent automatically untaints the Wong Sun "poisoned 
fruit" in conflict with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1982), and other precedent? 
4. Does Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
confer a greater protection than the Fourth Amendment; and 
if yes, does the Utah Constitution mandate the application 
of a "but for" exclusionary rule for evidence seized as a 
result of a prior illegality? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Priority 13 
Case No. 890128 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT/PETITIONER 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Arroyo, 
No. 880062-CA (filed February 15, 1989) is attached as 
Appendix A to this petition. A copy of that Courtfs order 
denying Respondent's Petition for Rehearing is attached 
hereto as Appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on February 
15, 1989 (Appendix A). The Court denied Mr. Arroyo's Peti-
tion for Rehearing on March 22, 1989 (Appendix B). A 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was timely filed with this 
Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. A Writ of Certiorari was granted May 15, 1989. This 
1 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 
78-2-2(5) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Summary of Proceedings Below. 
Petitioner, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was arrested and 
charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute for Value in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). 
After a preliminary hearing, the Petitioner was bound over 
to the District Court on the narcotics charge. Arroyo moved 
to suppress the evidence asserting that his stop by a high-
way patrol trooper for the traffic violation of "Following 
Too Closely11 was a pretext stop. The trial court granted 
the Motion to Suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and an Order Suppressing the evidence on 
January 6, 1989. A copy of the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as Appendix C. 
The State of Utah appealed the trial court's suppression 
order. 
On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court's order suppressing the evidence. The court 
held that: 
1. The trial judge's determination that 
the stop of Arroyo's vehicle was an un-
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constitutional pretext to search for 
drugs was a correct determination be-
cause a reasonable officer would not 
have stopped Arroyo for "Following Too 
Closely" except for some unarticulated 
suspicion of more serious criminal act-
ivity; 
2. Arroyo, through his counsel, stipu-
lated that he had consented to the 
search of his vehicle and based upon 
misleading conduct by Arroyo's counsel, 
said stipulation also included that the 
consent was given voluntarily; 
3. Although the original illegal stop 
was unconstitutional, Arroyo's subse-
quent voluntary consent purged the taint 
from the initial illegality, and the 
Motion to Suppress was therefore im-
properly granted, 
Mr. Arroyo petitioned for rehearing. The Petition was 
denied without comment and without addressing that the Court 
of Appeals' decision had been based upon the erroneous con-
clusion that Arroyo's counsel had mislead the trial Court 
and the State by stipulating that Arroyo had consented to 
the search of his vehicle. This Court granted a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
B. Pertinent Facts. 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15, 1987, Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul Mangelson, was driving home 
after completing his shift an hour earlier. Trooper 
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Mangelson was driving southbound on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah, 
when he observed a northbound truck-camper allegedly follow-
ing the car in front of it too closely. Trooper Mangelson 
executed a U-turn through the median and caught up with 
Arroyof s truck. 
Trooper Mangelson claimed that the truck was following 
the vehicle in front of him at a distance of three to eight 
car lengths at a speed of approximately 50 mph. Trooper 
Mangelson pulled along side the truck in order to observe 
its occupants and estimate the truck's speed. Trooper 
Mangelson noted that Arroyo and his passenger were hispanic, 
and that the vehicle had out of state license plates. 
Arroyo, the driver, was cited for "Following Too 
Closely" and for Driving on an Expired Driver's License. 
Trooper Mangelson then requested permission to search the 
truck, and Arroyo agreed. 
The search revealed approximately one kilogram of co-
caine inside the passenger door panel. Trooper Mangelson 
then arrested Arroyo for possession of a control substance 
with intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1986), second degree 
felony. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURi wr . I-\. '- „_:•..*. 
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL STIPULATED THAT ARRO\ ^  JIA? CON1""" 
SENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE IS CONTRARY TO THE 
RECORD. 
Before •; - trial court Petitioner'? coun: .-. . .- :.---• 
..<.
 t : M . • • r'itu-' stop, The additional 
issues - *;.- ; .niauneso .- • * . « 
ruestior «~f wither t * government c- uid c^ia^.,. 
brea- * * " ^ v^on =• pretext s*"-'p .:r\c 
the evicen:e obtained i:o.i . -. onsent" >i«lc' 
: ' e s s i o n h e a r in-* e t i t . :ner' • c o u n s e l otji..-,td 
tiiat tiic ti.t.a^ CwU vN^ '^e^or^ « nnt : 3n 
of wher^.nr Trooper M a n g e i s o n - - • . .. 
-'.'.' . :• S t a v e _ y . S i e r r a , ^54 P.Id •• 
Ct . Af.p ..;._, ;trurtrjd e a r ? - ----
ducted : ;rsuant • , -i -iar/ary consent • ari p^ige ;:.-- * 
from r- . . - - *~ r\ - not v-ev decided 
until after the suppression heariii'j held 11 ,i^ r court. 
ri~- > * -.-.-w- ,* < z *^rjsi -;n reversing 
t h e t r : iJ c o u r t ' s o i d e . . sup^OL 
1hr r c vouns^ 1 Had s t i p u l a t e d t n a : Arrc ; \o va^ cw*. 
seni*-u - .. ' ^ j y a l s m i s c o n s t r u e d t h e 
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facts when it concluded that Petitioner's counsel had enter-
ed into such a stipulation. There was no stipulation. 
At the suppression hearing, the State's counsel 
endeavored to probe the question of whether Arroyo's "con-
sent" was voluntary. Arroyo's counsel objected on the basis 
that the only relevant issue was whether the original stop 
was a pretext. If Sierra is controlling, then counsel was 
in error. The trial court agreed with Petitioner's counsel 
and sustained the objection. However, Arroyo's counsel did 
not at that time stipulate that Arroyo had consented to the 
search of the vehicle. The only representation made in that 
regard was* made by the State's counsel, and not Arroyo's 
counsel. The colloquy was as follows: 
Trooper Mangelson: I approached the vehicle. I 
asked for a driver's license. I made as many 
observations about the vehicle as I could. 
Question (Don Eyre, Juab County Attorney): Descr-
ibe what you observed. Answer: I observed . . . 
Mr. Bugden: Your Honor, for the record, I think I 
would object to any further inquiry at this point. 
My motion only goes to the propriety and the law-
fulness of the stop. And I think that is what . . 
The Court: Was this a consent search? 
Mr Eyre: Yes, sir. 
The Court: I think that is true, counsel. It goes 
strictly to the stop. 
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Mr. Eyre: \J.*. Question: Anything else abou t 
the stop that you recall that you have not pre-
viously testified to? Answer ~ ^ V t bel ieve 
sc 
Page -; , transcript of Suppression Hearn.g. 
Thus, the recora ciio.., - v " K-* - * -
"^ .'tb County Attorney, - asserted - •• * i.< LLIU. Z,CI~~ . t 
. - * * search - ru log that Arr-:v:*s 
counsel stipulated th^: Arroyo ^ :. —- tue 
**,"*• * appeals committed aanifest er::c r, 
"
T
 *~ i ~ i V s fundamental 
misreading of tr.ho record was the basis « > I I In 
-•=iversiii ' ' * :•'* remanding th:3 natte: t= • ".->-- ^^-'a1 
court. because . -rreo^'v believed 
that Petitioner's counsel .aa stip^idie,. t^aL. __^.-. •.• :3 
* ' .-.^ 0,^  .;h,z.r- t - ,.-, ,::t,::r;e attempted tc 
establish voluntary conser * -. ; - ^^narertly 
a^crib*^ a cevicas ntt-iv Petitioner s couiiool. . -• : 
t j : " - — ' .\p'^^iQ -hen determined that 
the appropriate u^*i._ . . . .* «. .1 t: - . , ' t o 
find b o r * j<" * Z'tnclusicr, f , :oi * -u- rirst time 
on appea^, "- ;rt appeals found "?-:.• 
fact ..•: . . .rtarv consent un .,.,«., .09.1. cc*.w . . 
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"voluntariness" based upon a stipulation which the record 
demonstrates never happened. 
To large extent, the result reached by the Court of 
Appeals occurred because of a blurring or imprecise use of 
the word "consent". Fourth Amendment analysis of consent 
requires reaching a conclusion of consent on at least three 
different levels. The Court of Appeals lost sight of this 
important distinction. 
In the first instance, a finding of consent must be 
made in the sense that law enforcement requests permission 
to search, and consent or acquiescence is given (Officer: 
Mr. Defendant, may I search your truck? Defendant: Yes, 
you may; I guess I have no choice). When that happens, it 
can fairly be said that consent has been given. 
On the next level, a finding must be made whether that 
consent was given voluntarily. Coercion, explicit or im-
plied, would negate a finding of voluntary consent. Some of 
the factors a court might consider when deciding the volun-
tariness question of fact include the defendant's age, 
intelligence, whether the defendant was in custody, the 
nature of the police questioning, the environment in which 
it took place, and the defendant's knowledge of his right to 
withhold consent. 
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Finally, c • - ~ ^ decided as a conclusion 
of law, See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, ' '-' 
/ A- I-
 t 
*i rcumstances test must he applre ,.e 
prosecute ... .L.,: . ' n : '
 :n*-^y consent. 
' ne ":a .** n ..*;: *. • . w.t.^ oetweei. i;. * * - . 
< • -. • •"". •* i^'i'Tod by * Tie C-urt o; Appeals 
oecause . r tn^ 1-. .Jdmoii...^ 1 ^.. cord, ii^:^ 
was r.-~ -+ i r *: i a+-ion a? J i onserv; iGb.^. 
*~ add?- tri the confusion on 
this issue. X\iV Finding *
 t .u-.- -
1
 ' -r—jor;jon tn search the Defendant s vehicle, and 
the Deiu^.j. - . • • ~-~- — — > . -ehicl^." 
Based on this Finding e: r.-„ _ _ - * «*-
-"T^  specifically fcuri i tha+ Arro/" cjnenttG _o 
the seai » *.^;^. ,^ _-^  record 
i" contradict this finci*:--: B, i ^o o ^tem^ . , 
n
 *- * "^-* " ^ ^ri-luded that *~he t, .al - , .r4-
sidered „:._ ^n^*,4 : _ . 
Because beta Arroyo's counse 'IK.J ,it u .,., 
e -j- * - *^ ^ * ien^p ^h.r1 wouJ I a,/ ' ave been 
discovered ffbut r. <,,; I,.L \ *. • °e 
inadm: -rsabl P. absolutely r o fac t s u^r j '.,iesei:ied a.. . ^ 
slipup: - : •- J- i mention with the consent Issue. 
The trial court found nothing more in Finding of Fact 18 
than that Trooper Mangelson requested permission to search 
Arroyo's truck and Arroyo agreed or consented. The record 
contains no findings to support a conclusion of law of 
voluntary consent. See State v. Sierra, 754. P.2d 972 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). The trial court entered no conclusions of 
law concerning either consent or the voluntariness of that 
consent. 
Under these circumstances, a remand is certainly ap-
propriate to consider the consent issue. Contrary to the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion, Petitioner's counsel did not 
enter into any stipulation, and accordingly, he did not 
mislead the State and the Court. Petitioner's counsel 
interposed an objection when the State sought to develop the 
consent issue. If Sierra is controlling on this point, then 
counsel was wrong in so doing. He erred. However, no 
mischievous intent or design was contemplated. By object-
ing, counsel did nothing more than any lawyer does when he 
erroneously objects and the trial judge erroneously sustains 
the objection. Under these circumstances, if the "but for" 
test is rejected and Sierra is controlling, then a remand 
for a hearing consistent with State v. Sierra, supra, is 
certainly warranted. 
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P0IN1 J-JL . IHh ula:: CU6h L" OF APPEALS DECIDED BOTH THE 
CONSENT "ISSUE AND THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONSENT-
ISSUE CONTRARY TO ITS DECISION IN STATE V. SIERRA/ 754 
P,2d nr7° Mj+.a* P+-_ Apo. 1988). 
The c\a_ ike '^ierr < supra. :-\ 
Sierra, the louri : Appeals , emanc d th-
•..--: ' - -efficient findings - f facr anu 
conclusions . . . . • . cnr^nt was volun-
tary arc .nether the evidence wca p:o ;:OJ . ; - xp 1. o>i f. a -
. •.-T-!1 • *-•/ ^r^ instead was obtained :;y 
means sufficient!
 1 u . o ^ ;: .,•.. .L •: - . tiax i^ 1—^ai 
stcr Sierra -\ r omand was ordered be ause so many _. -
tuui I S L U - J O .sor^ -' -4 andevelooed : the record: 
State has trie burden or piuvx.u^, t 
~ V s consent was, in fact volun 
,- given. *;: .mper v_. State, 391 U.S. 
543 383.Ct. "T783, T^91~ ^ L.Fd.2d 
~~~ ; 1 j*^jo ; . The record below .».-j:ely 
:;:a^es that, according to Tfficei 
• , "iierra offered to let him search 
the trunk of the car. Tte record con-
tains no facts indicating Sierra con-
sented ' Officer Smith's search of the 
interior of the car, where be discovered 
the incriminating evidence, "or does 
the record reveal exactly how Offic r 
Smith went from searching the trunk i 
the car to searching the passenger side 
of the interior; how Officer Smith rame 
to searching underneath the car and 
looking at the gas tank; how Officer 
Smith retrieved the keys to tue car to 
verify the gas level reading; noi how 
Sierra responded, if at all, ro Officer 
Smith* s conduct. A translate:- was re-
11 
quired for Sierra at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, which supports his 
claim that he had difficulty communicat-
ing with Officer Smith. The district 
court did not find that SierraTs consent 
was voluntary nor did it find that the 
evidence procured was not obtained by 
the officers' "exploitation of [the pri-
mary illegality]" and "sufficiently dis-
tinguishable" from the initial illegal 
stop. (Emphasis supplied, Id. at 981). 
In the instant matter these same deficiencies in the 
record exist. Because ArroyoTs counsel and the trial court 
applied a "but for" test, no facts were presented in connec-
tion with the consent issues. The consent and the attenua-
tion issues are separate and distinct: 
By definition, then, Fourth Amendment 
"voluntarines" necessarily requires a 
finding by the district court that the 
evidence was obtained freely and not by 
police "exploitation of [the primary] 
illegality . . . Wong Sun, supra 371 
U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417, making 
the two findings mutually exclusive. 
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 
1150 (10th Cir. 1986). (Emphasis sup-
plied) • 
The omission in this regard does not justify a reversal. 
Instead, just as in Sierra, this case should be remanded to 
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the t n . , • 'ot^ rr-i nati *n of bet:; - . 
voluntary consent and the attenuuii. -" . 
POINT III: THE CONCLUSION OF THE ,' OF APPEALS THA. 
THE VOLUNTARY CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER NECESSARILY 
ESTABLISHED A BREAK IN THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE ILLEGAL PRETEXT STOP AND THE EVIDENCE SUBSEQUENTLY 
OBTAINED IS IN CONFLICT WITH ESTABLISHED LAW, 
Even i: :t is assumed, contrary to the reouil II I lln-
; . j. • rinsider *~b^ consent issue, the 
-, ':/ issibil i t
 ± ^ : _ . - « ,,'/ idem -n cannot be corro'"iiy 
decided .ci.>cs 1 r.v * : ; <. . .1 * found from the evideni.;i: .1 
bi I'-'-1? ; + • ")r ier tc adra: * r - e 
challenged evidtjnc- . .. * * 
Find:'" * ^ * r ^  ** -;id Conclusions or Law that Arrovw s con-
sent A ^ , ice. VPVO» *; ^  ^ '.e in-
stant renter, this rssu-. * .10 i.^er r^a_ - 1 
* ~ *
 l
 " * " - ""^ '^ -t f Apnea > ^ n^ered tnis F .icing of 
Fact foi t:^ I^J.^ • /ashment f^r what 
the Court of Appeals perceived t-.j ,we .\een i^apyi. i.i'e 
: * * ' " """ *• - O ' T ^ P -*t e-en if the:- ^as a 
voluntary consent w2 ;.. ::\ .- ; ' ievcid nf 
any Findings of Fact ; .exclusions 01" .-.dw .^.. ;.;^ . , ,; je y \ 
wne;.. - : *• • ; .'.ched a br-^k : *-he causal connec-
tion between •;:.<- illegal pretext .  
subsequently obtained in the search of the vehicle. The 
Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that such a Finding of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law had been made by the trial court 
when none in fact had been made. Finding of Fact 18 does 
not support a conclusion of law on the voluntariness of the 
consent. 
The Court of Appeals' assumption that a voluntary con-
sent necessarily vitiates or attenuates the taint of a prior 
illegal stop is contrary to the decisional law which has 
developed on this point. Indeed, the Arroyo decision con-
tradicts the Court of Appeals own decision to remand in 
Sierra. 
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals relied on 
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1986). 
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals interpretation 
of Carson is overbroad when viewed in context with other 
rulings from the Tenth Circuit. 
To understand the Court of Appeals1 misapplication of 
Carson, a review of the facts is necessary. Carson involved 
a dove hunting violation. A deputy sheriff observed the 
defendant hunting, and noticed a large pail belonging to the 
defendant. The pail contained dead doves. The sheriff then 
left the area and contacted a state game protection officer. 
14 
;f:*~^r requested pei 'Mission to search 
* rie defendant
 ;j v e n . ^ ^ . . ^-i- ; • " *^e 
~ -- ~h . f,,V- <-- T-^*= "-; i * /vas searched -mc * a ^ i^^. 
.lC Jci-.;.^. -- i •* •• : • ' — ' " _:.- trial 
court found tnat ".:;ia: i^ iiv.u * -
: 'efenda-t claimed that the second search 
was tiif? . . ,i i " r' '"~M:r^  re-
jected *~re defendant's argument *-. , *•--. -
;. <-.-:- i ' 'umstances r-\ -h- i .-.-. -nado * he evidence 
admissible . *.. i; • - .^ .^  .-• .. - ulted 
States, ":;"7I ,! • . -" ru.ied t:iat the Supreme 
'V :rt w- * nusa. v f - analysis ir 
applying ::• tvxc. asionar ^  . .- . • • -~iiiea 
that two alternatives bo considered in J : aei :. ucl-ji.;..ne 
the dc ' i" "?^ -'zf i s it ceq^er^ 
legal searci., rirst, . .- -^^...je *_ 
*• -
: j
 - ~
;
f~- cf poi : ? P e x p l o i t a t i o n o: ".<* prior .n.n*., _ 
conuu^. \ L..- i.-, . • ^ -ih -^ond < ' • 
evidence was ob t a ined ; .• - I'lanner . . u t i i . . en : . _ .: >. 
ab.-* " .ui i l l e g a l i t y sr^  * hat *-ie evidence- * * 
purgeo , *.«v ^i^mary t j . u±d a l s ^ oe 
admissible. 
In the context of a claimed voluntary consent to 
search, the Tenth Circuit court held that the "exploitation 
of the primary illegality" meant that the law enforcement 
agents used the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce 
the defendant into granting his consent. The court noted 
that normally the issue would be resolved by determining if 
the grant of consent was voluntary. However, the manner of 
the request to search may also render the consent involun-
tary. The court described the critical facts that supported 
its conclusion. First, the defendant had no idea his pail 
had even been searched the first time and accordingly, he 
was totally unaware that the prior illegal search had even 
taken place. Second, there was no use of the illegal first 
search to coerce the consent. Those facts are distinguish-
able from the facts in the case at bar. 
Moreover, notwithstanding a finding of voluntary con-
sent, courts have frequently held that the State has not 
carried its burden to purge the primary illegality of the 
Wong Sun taint. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1982), a 
suspect's consent to search his two suitcases was tainted by 
his illegal detention and was ineffective to justify the 
search of his two suitcases. Royer was approached at an 
airport by detectives who asked for his airline ticket and 
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driver's license. Without returning the ticket and license 
the detectives asked Royer to accompany them to a small 
room. After obtaining Royer's luggage from the airline 
without his consent, he then produced a key and unlocked one 
suitcase. Drugs were found in that suitcase. Royer then 
indicated to the detectives that he did not know the com-
bination to the lock of the second suitcase. When asked if 
he objected to the detective opening the suitcase, Royer 
said, "no, go ahead," and did not object when the detective 
further explained the suitcase might have to be pried 
open. The trial court concluded that RoyerTs consent to 
the search was "freely and voluntarily given". The Florida 
District Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that "at the time 
his consent to search was obtained, he was unlawfully con-
fined 
and consent to search was therefore invalid because tainted 
by the unlawful confinement." 460 U.S. at 495. The Florida 
Court of Appeals held that because there was no proof in a 
"break in a chain of illegality" the consent was invalid as 
a matter of law. In affirming the suppression order, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
Because we affirm the Florida District Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that Royer was being illegally 
detained when he consented to the search of his 
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luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by 
the illegality . . . 
Id at 507. 
The Petitioner submits that the same reasoning applies 
in the instant matter. Once the conclusion is reached that 
the Petitioner was unlawfully stopped, and therefore unlaw-
fully detained by Trooper Mangelson, then the State in the 
instant matter has the same burden that the State in Florida 
v. Royer was unable to sustain. 
In United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 
1981), an informant contacted the DEA and provided informa-
tion that a person was selling heroin from a particular 
motel room. The informant furnished the DEA with a descrip-
tion of the individual. The DEA contacted the motel clerk 
and confirmed that the defendant matched the description 
provided by the informant. The clerk advised the DEA that 
the defendant was expecting a package. When the package 
arrived, the motel clerk contacted the DEA. The package had 
been damaged, and when the DEA agent was handling the pack-
age, it broke open and a bindle fell out. The bindle tested 
positive for heroin. Additionally, a trained dog altered 
on the package. A search warrant was then obtained and most 
of the contents of the package were seized. However, the 
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defendant was permitted to pick up the package with some of 
its contents still intact. As soon as the defendant took 
possession of the package he was arrested. Permission was 
then requested to search his vehicle and a room in a dif-
ferent motel. The defendant executed written consent forms. 
Opium was found in both locations. On appeal, the issue 
presented was whether the defendant's post-arrest consent 
was a sufficiently independent act to avoid the exclusion of 
the opium. The Ninth Circuit concluded that even assuming 
the consent was voluntary, "the evidence must nonetheless be 
suppressed if the unconstitutional conduct was not suffi-
ciently attenuated from the subsequent seizure to avoid 
exclusion of the evidence . . . " The Petitioner submits 
that the same should hold true in the instant matter. Even 
assuming a voluntary consent, the government must still 
establish that the consent sufficiently attenuated the taint 
from the prior unlawful pretext stop. In Taheri the 
government was unable to carry its burden: 
The government, which bears the burden of showing 
admissibility in these circumstances . . . points 
to no intervening events or lapse of time which 
would show Taheri?s consent was sufficiently an 
act of free will to purge the primary taint of the 
unlawful invasion. 
Id at 601. 
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For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the opium was 
inadmissible. 
Similarly in United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th 
Cir. 1982), the Court stated, "we hold, as a matter of law 
on the undisputed facts of the record, that Goodingfs il-
legal seizure tainted all that ensued in the investigative 
encounter, and that his consent to the initial search, even 
if voluntary, did not vitiate the taint." Id at 84. The 
Gooding court suppressed the evidence. The Court held as 
follows: 
The connection between the illegal seizure and the 
consent—all occurring within the same brief, 
continuous encounter--was not sufficiently attenu-
ated to remove the former's taint from the 
ultimate fruits of a search. 
Id at 84. 
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 
1985), the Court focused upon the question of whether the 
consent to search was valid despite the unlawful seizure and 
detention of the Defendant. In Recalde, the District Court 
held that the consent was knowing and voluntary. In the 
instant matter, there was no such finding. 
By focusing only on the voluntariness of the Defen-
dant's consent and by not considering whether he had been 
unlawfully seized, the Recalde court concluded that the 
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District Court had misapplied the Supreme Court decisions 
governing the issues. Id at 1457. "The Court therefore did 
not make its finding in light of the requirement that such 
consent be free from the taint of the illegal detention. 
Because of this, and because of the illegal nature of 
RecaldeTs seizure and detention are critical, we conclude 
that the District Court's finding of consent is clearly 
erroneous." Id at 1458. Thus, notwithstanding that Recalde 
executed a written consent form, the Court, held that the 
consent was tainted by his prior illegal arrest and deten-
tion. The Petitioner submits that the same conclusion will 
be borne out by the evidence in the instant matter. 
In United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 
1988), the Tenth Circuit found that the stop of the vehicle 
for a seat belt violation was a pretext for an investiga-
tion. The District Court had failed to make any findings 
with respect to the issue of the consent to search. The 
case was remanded to the District Court so that the proper 
findings could be made. The Court ordered that findings on 
the issue of consent be made applying the factors discussed 
in Recalde, supra. In doing so, the Court noted that there 
would be few cases involving an illegal detention where a 
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subsequent search could be made legitimate by a voluntary 
consent. 
POINT IV: ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION CONFERS GREATER PROTECTION THAN THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION SECURED BY THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188 (Ut. 1986), and State 
v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Ut, 1986), a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Utah took the position that Article I, Section 14 
of the Constitution of Utah may be interpreted to provide 
broader protection than the Fourth Amendment. Since both 
provisions share nearly identical language this would not be 
the result of any textual, differences between the two provi-
sions. The result obtains because a state court may inter-
pret its own constitution independent of the federal deci-
sions, and such decisions are not subject to federal review 
or reversal. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Also 
see, State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 
(Utah 1987). 
A state constitutional interpretation of Wong Sun 
poisoned fruits could greatly simplify the law on this 
issue. If a "but for" test was applied, then law enforce-
ment officers would not be permitted to profit from prior 
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illegal conduct. In contrast, allowing law enforcement to 
attenuate the taint by relying upon some intervening event, 
such as consent, police are essentially rewarded for violat-
ing Fourth Amendments rights• That is to say, by permitting 
officers to legitimate illegal stops by obtaining consent, 
an officer's illegal actions are judicially condoned. 
However, under Utah constitutional precepts, any prior 
illegality could be held to vitiate or taint any consent 
which flowed from the prior unlawful conduct. 
Moreover, under a purely state analysis, this Court 
could require that officers inform defendants that they have 
the right to refuse to permit a search. Likewise, if a 
defendant is truly free to leave an encounter with a police 
officer, then this Court could require that defendants be so 
informed before a voluntary consent may be established by 
the prosecution. 
Such holdings based solely on the Utah Constitution 
would alleviate a number of confusing areas related to the 
law of search and seizure. Law enforcement officers would 
then only need to follow the stricter state requirements. 
Federal search and seizure, with its many cumbersome and 
many times esoteric exceptions, would be irrelevant to the 
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officer on the street. Such simplicity would make the 
application of search and seizure law easier, 
CONCLUSION 
Applying a state constitutional analysis, Mr, Arroyo 
respectfully requests that the trial courtTs ruling sup-
pressing the evidence be affirmed. In the alternative, Mr. 
Arroyo respectfully requests the matter be remanded to the 
trial court for a Sierra hearing on the consent and attenua-
tion issues. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ° day of June, 1989. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN/ JJ 
Attorney for RespWide^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and cor 
rect copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, this 
day of June, 1989 to: 
Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Sandra Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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34 Starter • . Arroyo cooa*co 
this 
for dismissal oa • this 
That motion wit denied by the Utah 
Court bfi cm the CMC WM tnntffTTod to 
Wt are not mematd to disturb the 
I G w l ' l mlpOMtiOQ Of this 1006; g a d reject 
Marveon s jiinscxxjonai cnajscngg. see vjooott t. 
AJL. WUliMmt * A0OO, 739 PJ2d 634, 636 (Utah 
Ct.App.19f7). 
X On the contrary, the 'strict construction* rait 
that if employed in connection with ineuranoe poo* 
des eooonspneoM just the opposite result* Any 
ambiguity concernint the scope of Insurance is 
awaurued in favor of en wage. See, e^« Puflar r, 
XXrector of Pittance, 694 PJ&d 1045. 1047 (Utah 
1915) ('An insured is entitled to the broadest prot-
ection be could have reasonably understood to be 
provided by the policy."); W&Bams v. first Cottony 
life Ins. Co.. 393 PJd 334, 336 (Utah 1979) 
(ambiguity in insurance contract zsust be ooawtrued 
in favor of insured); XXeees v. Safeco U£* Ins. Cou. 
21 Utah 2d 147. 442 PJ2d 4 0 . 471 <196f) (no 
ambiguous n element may be enforced *igi''t*^ an 
insured). See a te CoJard r. American PmaOy Mat. 
In*. Co., 709 PJd 11. 14 (Colo. App. 1913) Of en 
insurance company Intends to exclude from coverage 
damage resulting from the insured t own negligence, 
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American 
Ernst ins. Co. v. MCM Grand Hottis. Xncw 729 
PJM 1332. 1334 (Nev. 1986) (Insurance contracts are 
construed to accompBsh the object of providing 
indemnity to the insured); Weidoo r. Commerdtd 
Uaiotx Aasuraace Co*. 103 NJ4. 322. 710 PJEd » . 
91 (19t5) ("When an ambiguity exists, the court 
must const! ue the policy so as to sustain indem-
nity."). > >•. 
4. Under different facts, the lack of expttdt kn*»~ 
uage cicaily indicating an Intra! to provide coverage 
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the 
nucsooa ot wnetner sucn coverage WM tntenoeo. 
-However, sucn amnignity WQUIQ oe rcsorveo rnrougn 
the ordinary ruies of contract interpretation rather 
by invoking the stria, construction rule. See 
WUbum•>. Iauntmm Ekccric. 74t.ff.2d 
3S2.3S3-S6 (Utah CX App. 196S). 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
i Appeamatt) 
• . 
loot Francisco A&ROYO, 
Dcfeadaataad 
Walter P. Bugden, Jr., Salt Like Otyf for 
JLespoodent 
Before Judges Davidson, BQfinfs. and Gtrff. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS. Judge: 
The State of Utah filed an htteriocutory appeal 
cha fir ngjng the district court's aippressioo of 
cocaine acted after a Utah Highway trooper 
stopped lose Pi am lair). Arroyo ('Arroyo*) for an 
alleged traffic violation. The trial court found the 
jtop of Arroyo's vehicle was a pretext stop which 
violated Arroyo*! fourth amendment rights. We 
NewSSMCUCA 
FILED: February 15.19*9 
Fourth District,'Juab County 
Honorable Ray M. Harding . 
ATTORNEYS: ' • >•? 
David L. Wilkinson aad Sondra L* Sjogren, 
s- Salt Lake City, for AppeUaat 
FACTS 
At apptojdmatery 4:00 pjn. on September 13, 
19f7, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mang-
cboa (Trooper Mangdson*) was driving home 
after completing his shift an hour earner. Trooper 
Mingffsoa was driving south bound on 1*13 near 
Nephi, Utah, when he observed a northbound 
truck-camper following the car in front of. it too 
closer/. Trooper. Maagelsott .made a U-turn 
through the median and caught up with Arroyo's 
tiuck« 
Trooper Mangdson observed that the truck was 
following the venide in front of him at a distance 
of three to eight.car lengths at a speed of appro* 
Timet fry fifty; miks per hour. Trooper Mart gri son 
polled alnwgrirht the truck in order to observe its 
occupants and estimate the truck's tpctd. 
Trooper Maaaebon noted that Arroyo and. his 
peawnaer . were. Hispanic, and he stopped the 
truck..,•, ***„i.,..\.-
Arroyo, the driver, was dted for • following- too 
. closely* and for driving on. an expired driver's 
Boense. Trooper- MtngHtnn then asked Arroyo if 
he could search mstiuck. and Arroyo agreed. 
.The' search, .reveaied approximately one kilo-
gram of cocaine inside tbc'peseeager door paneii. 
Trooper Msrtgflson then arrested Arroyo for 
poeaeaskxi of a con trowed mbs/sime with, intent to 
distribute m violation of Utah Code Amu §5*-
374(lXiffl (19<6>. a second degree felony. ^ ^ 
- Arroyo moved to suppress the cocaine daiming 
Trooper Meageisoo's traffic stop was a pretext to 
search his truck for evidence of a more serious 
crime.. The trial court found no traffic violation 
had occurred and ruled that Trooper Mangeison's 
stop of Arroyo's truck was a pretext to Investi-
gate-a vehicle ac found wipidous because of out-
of-state., license plates and Hispanic omipantt, 
The trial court found Arroyo consented to the 
sueeeouent search of his tnw'k, but nevertheless. 
granted •', the \ motion to suppress. The. State 
The issues, on appeal are (1) whether the trial 
court cried . in ruling that Trooper Mangdson'i 
stop of Arroyo for 'following too dosery' was a 
pretext stop, and (2) whether Arroyo'r subseq-
uent consent ux the search of his truck purged the 
,iamsOCtneoineAwu)eunconsunn^ 
. The trial court's factual evaluation underlying 
its decision tn> grant or deny a motion to suppress 
wul not be disturbed unless it is dearry erroneous. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
APPENDIX 
„ _ ^ i WWIMHIJ. MMIG v. ajena, | 
754 ?3d 972, 974 (Utah <X App. 19SSJ. 
However, is reviewing the trial court's legal 
coochitiona baaed upon those finding!, we afford 
no deference and apply a correction of error sta-
ndard.. Gates v. Qirtz , 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 
1988), 
PRETEXT STOP 
We first consider whether Trooper Mangdtoo's 
stop of Arroyo's truck was incident to a lawful 
stop for a traffic violation or was a constitution-
ally defective 'pretext* stop. A ponce officer may 
stop a vehide for a traffic violation committed in 
the officer's presence. Nevertheless, a police 
officer may not 'use a misdemeanor arrest as a 
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious 
crime/ Sierra, 754 PJd at 977. Courts must look 
to the totality of the circumstances to determine I 
whether a stop for a traffic violation and subse-
quent arrest is a pretext. This involves 'an obje-
ctive, assessment of the officer's actions in light of 
ffif facts w\ <"4wi»fnff^ »r»* cotxfrouting hv*\ at I 
the time.* Id. The actual state of mind of the 
officer at the time of the chaiknged action is irr-
elevant, id. (quoting MjuyiMnd v. Macon, 472 
U.S. 463 (1985)). Thus, in this appeal, the ques-
tion is whether a reasonable officer. In view of 
the totality of the cuxumstanccs of this case, 
would have stopped Arroyo for 'following too 
doscry.* The proper focus is not on whether 
Trooper Mangrison could have validly made the 
stop. Sferra, 754PJdat978. . . 
Trooper Mangirhon observed Arroyo following 
the vehide in front of him at a distance of 
between three and eight car lengths at a speed of 
approximately fifty miles per hour. It is notewo-
rthy that Trooper MsngHson had enm plrtrri his 
shift an hour earner, and was driving home in the 
opposite direction from Arroyo when he observed 
the alleged traffic violation, one for which very 
few citations are issued.3 Trooper Mangdsoo did 
not stop Arroyo until he had pulled alongside the 
track, and observed that the occupants were 
Hispanic, having already noted that Arroyo was 
driving a truck with out-of-state license plates. 
We agree with the trial judge that the stop was 
an uncoostitudonal pretext.to search for drugs. 
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would 
not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for 
'following too closely* except for some unartic-
uuued suspidoo of more serious criminal activity. 
CONSENT 
Our inquiry does not end with the determination 
that Trooper Mangdson's stop of Arroyo, was 
unconnitntional. We must next consider whether 
Arroyo's subsequent consent to the search of his 
truck purged the taint of the Hkgsl stop thereby 
making admissible the cocaine seixed. The appr-
opriate Inquiry is "whether, granting establish-
ment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at 
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint." Sierra, 754 P.2d u 930 
(quoting Wong Sun v. United StMtes, 371 VS. 
471,4S7-M (1963)). I 
UTAH ADVA* 
! a Dut for* exclusionary rule for evidence seized 
as a result of prior flkgaiiry.' IdL (citations 
omitted). Thus, even though this evidence would 
not have been dacovered *but for* the prior 
illegal stop* the evidence, is not per at Inadmiss-
ible. JdL Moreover, a search conducted pursuant 
to vo/untarr consent purges the taint from the 
prior illegality. Sen*, 754 ?Jd at 980 (citing Wong 
Sua v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 4S7-
81 (1963)). Accord United States v. Carson, 793 
F^d 1141. 1148-49 (10th Or. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S.O. 315 (1986); State v. Aqwhr. 
758 PJd. 457, 459 (Utah 0 . App. 1988). To 
determine whether consent is voluntary, we look 
to the totality of the circumstances to see if the 
consent was in fact voluntarily given and not the 
result of **duress or coercion, express or 
implied." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980 (quoting Sen-
necxioth v. fliisramonfr, 412 VS. 218, 219 
(1973)). The State bears the burden of proving 
| that consent was voluntarily given. Sierra, 754 
PJdat981. 
In this regard, we note Arroyo did not contest 
the State's argument at the suppression hearing 
that he voluntarily consented to the search of his 
duck. Arroyo, through his counsel tripulamd that 
he consented to the starch. Arroyo's counsel 
objected when the State attempted to offer evid-
ence to establish Arroyo's consent was voluntary, 
daimhtg it was not relevant as the only issue was 
whether the original stop was a pretext. As a 
result, the trial court limited tnttmony concerning 
I the cuxumsfanfTS surrounding Arroyo s consent. 
The trial judge specifically found that Arroyo 
I consented to the search of his truck, and there is 
I f^^k'it H tkf fTT^tf% ow*r^** r****** fi«w4i<*«> 
I For. the first ome on appeal, couneH now 
argues that Arroyo's consent was not voluntary 
as there was no *break in the causal connection 
between the Sega&ty and the evidence thereby 
obtained.* United States v. Jtocaide, 761 ¥J2d 
1448, 1458 (10th Or. 1985). However, this argu-
ment should have been made below. A defendant 
cannot mislead the State and the court by stipul-
ating that consent was given, thus preventing the 
State from exploring the circumsatnees of the 
consent, and then argue for the first time on' 
appeal that the consent given was not voluntary. 
I Bit^d on these nrrttiTt********* we conclude that 
defendant's stipulation induded that the consent 
was given voluntarily. 
Thus, sithrmgh the original illegal stop was 
L uncon*titutional, Arroyo's subsequent voluntary 
I consent purged the taint from the initial illegality, 
and the motion to suppress should not have been 
I granted. 
Accordingly, the order granting Arroyo's 
motion to suppress the evidence is reversed, and 
I the case is remanded for trial, 
Judith M. Bulings, Judge 
WE CONCUR; 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Richard C Davidson, Judge 
1. Our analysis is confined to the protections 
granted under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
REPORTS 
36 Taylor Y. Estate of Grant Taylor m Uufa A4v, to, H 
cooc^co 
Sum Constitution rtther than article 1, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Arroyo attempts to raise 
the nate constlttrtiooal issue aa has beta encouraged 
by oar Supreme Court. See, *L#., 1) Stale r. La/T-
erry; 749 P-2d 1239, 1247 n. 3 (Utah 19M); 2) Scan? 
v. JSarf. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). However, a 
three line oonduaory statement as to the greater 
scope of state constitutional protections is an insu-
ffient briefing for us to embark on a state constit-
utional analysts and we, therefore, refuse to do so. 
When analyzing state constitutional issues, our 
Supreme Court has cited with approval the appr-
oach taken in State v. Jewerx, 146 Vt. 221, 500 AJtf 
233(19*5). 
2. Toooper Mangelson testified that he had issued 
only three or four citations for "following too 
dosery" in 1987. 
Gta as 
. 102 Utah Adv. Res. 36 
IN T H E 
U T A H COURT OF APPEAJLS 
WeadeJ! E. Taylor, 
. Plaintiff mad Appellant, 
v. 
The ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR, 
skee atari, Esther Tayior, Darren G. Taylor* 
mad Jofca Does 1 through 5, 
Def eadaats and Respondeat*. 
No. SS0136-CA 
FIT JED: Febraary 15, 19tf 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
ATTORNEYS: 
A. Howard Lundgren, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Ldand S. McCullough, P. Bryan Fishbura, 
Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
.Before Judges Rilling*, Jackson and Onne, 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Wendell Taylor appeals the trial court*! entry 
of summary judgment against him. Wendell 
argues that 1) summary judgment was inapprop-
riate due to unresolved issues of material fact 
regarding the validity of his deceased brother's 
alleged will; 2) a document favorable to him 
should be given effect as his brother's will, even 
though it does not strictly comply with the Utah 
Probate Code; and 3) the trial court erred in 
ordering Wendell to pay a portion of defendants' 
attorney fees. We affirm in large part, but 
remand for reassessment of one aspect of the 
court's judgment. 
FACTS 
In January 1984, Grant Tayior loaned a sum of 
money to his brother, plaintiff Wendell Tayior. 
At the time of the loan, Grant had been divorced 
for about one month from Ins wife of more than 
forty years, defendant Esther Tayior. On June 30, 
1984, Grant' dictated a document to a second 
brother, Noel Taylor, providing that the loan to 
Wendell he forgiven upon Grant's death. Nod 
typed this document and Grant ttgocd it in the 
presence of Nod and Nod's wife, Geraldine. 
Nod then signed the document as a witness and 
filed it away. Geraldine did not sign the aVxrrment 
at that time. 
Shortly after executing the June 30 document, 
Grant, who had been ill with cancer, worsened 
considerably. On August 30, 1984, he excepted a 
document entitled 'Last Will and Testament.* In 
this docrtment, Grant made no provision for his 
former wife, Esther, nor did he mention the debt 
owed by Wendell or the June 30 document forg-
iving the debt. The wul recited that the bulk of 
Grant's estate go to a trust, created the same 
date, in favor of his children. 
Grant and Esther remarried on September 21, 
19$4, approximately ten months after their 
divorce. The trust Grant established on August 30 
was immediately amended to include Esther as a 
beneficiary. At the time of the remarriage, 
Grant's cancer had rendered him unable to walk 
or speak audibly and he died five days later. 
Shortly thereafter, his estate was informally pro-
bated pursuant to the August 30 will. 
Following Grant's death, efforts were made to 
obtain repayment from Wendell of the money 
Grant had loaned him* Unaware of the June 30 
document forgiving the debt, Wendell cornpiiined 
of these efforts to Nod, at which time Nod inf-
ormed Wendell of that document. However, the 
document was not located and delivered to 
Wendell until carry 1985. In October of that year, 
Wendell filed this action to invalidate the previ-
ously probated August 30 document and give 
testamentary effect to the terms of the original 
June 30 document forgiving repayment of the 
loan made by Grant. 
Wendell claimed that the June 30 document 
was actually Grant's last valid will, the August 30 
document being a product of dmcu or undue 
ififh^v^ Wendell attached to his complaint a 
copy of the June 30 document bearing only the 
signatures of Grant and Nod. Based on the fact 
that the purported will bore the signature of only 
one witness, defendants' counsd filed a motion 
to dismiss Wendell's complaint Two days before 
defendants' motion to dismiss was to be argued, 
Wendell filed an affidavit in which he claimed 
that the dnotmmt attached to his complaint was 
not aa accurate copy of the June 30 document. 
Attached to his affidavit was another copy of the 
document bearing the additions! witness signature 
of Geraldine Tayior. Accordingly, defendants' 
motion to dismiss was continued as it only addr-
essed the validity of a document bearing one 
witness signature. 
Defendants' counsd promptly deposed Nod 
and Geraldine Tayior. Geraldine testified that she 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jose Francisco Arroyo, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER 
No. 880062-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the Respondent. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 22nd day of March, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
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Clerk<ToY-the Court 
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STATE OF UTAH, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
v. : 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 81-D 
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On December 7, 1987, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
came on before this Court for an Evidentiary Hearing. The 
- ^ e was represented by its attorney, Donald J. Eyre, Jr., 
. the Defendant was present in person, and represented by 
his counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr. Highway Patrol Trooper 
Paul Mangelson and the Defendant Jose Francisco Arroyo both 
testified at thic hearing. After giving careful consideration 
to the testimony presented at the hearing, the demeanor of the 
witnesses on the witness stand, reviewing memoranda and case 
law submitted to the Court by both counsel, and listening to 
oral argument, this Court enters the following: 
APPENDIX C 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 15, 1987, at approximately 4:00 p.m. 
the Defendant, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was the driver of an 
older model Ford Pick-up with a camper. The vehicle was 
headed in the northbound direction on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah. 
2. On the same date, and at the same time, Highway 
Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving in a southbound 
direction on 1-15 when he observed the truck driven by the 
Defendant proceeding in a northbound direction. 
3. The Defendant testified he was driving in a group or 
cluster of three cars, his vehicle being the third vehicle in 
the group. Trooper Mangelson testified that he only saw two 
vehicles in the northbound direction and that the Defendant's 
vehicle was the rear vehicle. y 
4. Trooper Mangelson observed that the Defendant's 
vehicle had out of state (California) license plates. 
5. In July of 1987, Trooper Mangelson attended a 
seminar which focused upon the types of individuals who 
transport controlled substances and the types of vehicles that 
said controlled substances are transported in. 
6. Trooper Mangelson testified that by in large the 
Utah Highway Patrol had found that most drug trafficing was 
done by Colombians, Cubans, and Hispanics. 
7. Trooper Mangelson also testified that one of the 
topics discussed at the seminar was the necessity for having a 
reason to stop an automobile driven by a Colombian, Cuban, or 
-2-
8$& 
an Hispanic. Trooper Mangelson understood that he could not 
stop a vehicle just because the driver was of Latin origin, 
8. As a result Trooper Mangelson's training at this 
seminar, he admitted that whenever he observed an Hispanic 
individual driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the vehicle. 
The Trooper also admitted that once he stopped an Hispanic 
driver, 80% of the time he requested permission to search the 
vehicle. 
9. Trooper . MapgeJLgpn estimated the Defendant's speed 
was 50^ miles per hour. As the Trooper's vehicle passed the 
Defendant's vehicle heading in opposite directions, the 
Trooper testified that he believed the Defendant's vehicle was 
three to four, maybe five cars lengths behind the vehicle 
immediately in front of it. Based on the Trooper's estimate 
of the Defendant's speed, the Trooper testified that he 
concluded that the Defendant was "Following too Close" to the 
vehicle immediately in front of it. 
10. The Trooper then executed a U-turn through the 
median and caught up with the Defendant's vehicle within a 
half mile to a mile from the location of the initial 
observation of the Defendant's vehicle. 
11. Upon overtaking the Defendant's vehicle the Trooper 
testified that rather than pulling the Defendant over 
immediately, he instead pulled up along side the Defendant's 
vehicle in order to observe the occupants of >he Defendant's 
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12- Trooper Mangelson testified that the Defendant's 
vehicle was still three to four, maybe five cars lengths 
behind the vehicle directly in front of it, and that this 
distance was unsafe, and therefore the Defendant was 
"Following too Close" in violation of the applicable traffic 
code. 
13. When the Trooper pulled along side the Defendant's 
vehicle, the Trooper did observe that the two occupants of the 
Defendant's vehicle were of Latin origin. 
14. Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it 
was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an 
individual for "Following too Close" to record the license 
plate of the front car. However, the Trooper's denial on this-
point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the 
Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. The 
Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate 
number of the front car in this case. 
15. The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 tc 
95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in 
front of his own. The Court finds this testimony to be 
credible. 
16. In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper 
Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was 
"Following too Close" or that any other attested facts 
preponderated to the level necessary to permit a 
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constitutional stop of the Defendant's vehicle. Moreover, the 
Court finds that the Trooper's own testimony established the 
probability that no violation of law occurred, and that the 
alleged violation was only a pretext asserted by the Trooper 
to justify his stop of a vehicle with out of state license 
plates and with occupants of Latin origin, 
17. The Trooper stopped" the Defendant's vehicle for 
allegedly "Following too Close". Upon stopping the 
Defendant's vehicle, he asked for and received identification 
from the Defendant. However, upon receiving this 
identification, and learning from the Defendant that he had 
only recently acquired the automobile, the Trooper did not run 
a NCIC check on either the driver or the Defendant's vehicle 
(to verify if the vehicle was stolen). The Trooper denied 
that running a NCIC check was standard police procedure. 
18. The Trooper requested permission to search the 
Defendants vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the search 
of the vehicle. 
19. After searching the camper portion of the truck, 
Trooper Mangelson detected that a package of some sort was 
inside of the passengers's door. After gaining access to the 
inside panel of the passengers's door, Trooper Mangelson 
removed three bundles containing approximately one kilogram of 
a white powder wrapped in duct tape. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact of the Court now 
enters the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* A stop of an automobile can only be made upon 
reasonable and articulable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1986) or upon probable cause, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983). 
2. Trooper Mangelson lacked any reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to stop the Defendant in the case at bar. Instead, 
the stop of the Defendant by Trooper Mangelson for allegedly 
"Following too Close" was only a pretext utilized by the 
Trooper to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state 
license plates and with occupants of Latin origin. Pretext 
stops are unconstitutional. State v. Mendoza, Slip opinion no. 
20922 (Utah Dec- 1, 1987). 
3. The pretextural stop was employed by the Trooper to 
conceal his genuine investigative purpose. ESecause the stop 
of the Defendant in the case at bar was unsupported by either 
articulable suspicion or probable cause, the Defendant was 
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United states Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
4. A n evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's 
unlawful detention must be suppressed. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court now enters its: 
ORDER 
The stop that lead to the consensual search and seizure 
was a pretext stop and an unconstitutional violation of the 
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Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. All evidence procured as a result of the 
unlawful stop of the Detendant is therefore suppressed, 
DATED this <V>#£aay of \ r ^ ^ , , . , 199? [r • ^ 
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